

The Many Faces of Modal Logic

Day 1: Examples

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The Plan for Today

- ▶ Brief recap of propositional logic
- ▶ Good old modal logic
- ▶ A zoo of modal logics
 - ▶ Syntax
 - ▶ Semantics
 - ▶ Reasoning principles

Propositional Logic

That is, classical propositional logic:

$$\phi ::= \perp \mid p \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi_1 \wedge \phi_2 \quad (p \in V)$$

(\vee , \rightarrow , \leftrightarrow , \top defined).

Semantics: *valuations* $\kappa : V \rightarrow 2 = \{\perp, \top\}$

$$\kappa \not\models \perp$$

$$\kappa \models p \quad \text{iff} \quad \kappa(p) = \top$$

$$\kappa \models \neg\phi \quad \text{iff} \quad \kappa \not\models \phi$$

$$\kappa \models \phi_1 \wedge \phi_2 \quad \text{iff} \quad \kappa \models \phi_1 \text{ and } \kappa \models \phi_2$$

Satisfiability and All That

- ▶ ϕ *satisfiable* if $\kappa \models \phi$ for some κ
- ▶ ϕ *valid* or *tautology* ($\models \phi$) if $\kappa \models \phi$ for all κ
 - ▶ ϕ valid iff $\neg\phi$ unsatisfiable
- ▶ Φ set of formulas:

$$\Phi \models \psi \quad \text{iff} \quad \forall \kappa. (\kappa \models \Phi \rightarrow \kappa \models \psi)$$

$$\text{iff} \quad \exists \phi_1, \dots, \phi_n \in \Phi. \models \phi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \phi_n \rightarrow \psi$$

(*compactness*)

Boolean Algebra

Alternative semantics: valuations $\kappa : V \rightarrow A$, A Boolean algebra;

$$\kappa \models \phi \quad \text{iff} \quad \kappa(\phi) = \top$$

Stone duality:

A is a Boolean subalgebra of some 2^X .

This implies:

Validity in Boolean algebras = validity over 2 .

Normal Forms

Negation normal form (NNF): \neg only in front of atoms –

$$\phi ::= \perp \mid \top \mid p \mid \neg p \mid \phi_1 \wedge \phi_2 \mid \phi_1 \vee \phi_2.$$

Conjunctive normal form (CNF):

- ▶ Literal = atom or negated atom
- ▶ Clause = finite disjunction (set) of literals
- ▶ CNF = finite conjunction (set) of clauses.

Dual: conjunctive clause, DNF.

Modal Logic

$$\phi ::= \perp \mid p \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi_1 \wedge \phi_2 \mid \Box\phi \quad (p \in P)$$

with $\Box\phi$ read

- ▶ ‘necessarily ϕ ’
- ▶ ‘it is believed that ϕ ’ (doxastic)
- ▶ ‘it is known that ϕ ’ (epistemic)
- ▶ ‘it is obligatory that ϕ ’ (deontic)
- ▶ ...

Dual: $\Diamond = \neg\Box\neg$ ‘possibly’

Kripke Models

Kripke models (X, R, π) , where

- ▶ (X, R) *Kripke frame*
 - ▶ X set of *states* / *worlds*
 - ▶ $R \subseteq X \times X$ *accessibility* / *transition* relation
- ▶ $\pi : P \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(X)$ *valuation*

Satisfaction in Kripke Models

$x \models_M \phi$ 'state x in model M satisfies ϕ '; $\llbracket \phi \rrbracket_M = \{x \in M \mid x \models_M \phi\}$.

$$x \not\models_M \perp$$

$$x \models_M p \iff x \in V(p)$$

$$x \models_M \phi \wedge \psi \iff x \models_M \phi \text{ and } x \models_M \psi$$

$$x \models_M \neg \phi \iff x \not\models_M \phi$$

$$x \models_M \Box \phi \iff y \models_M \phi \text{ for all } y \in X \text{ such that } (x, y) \in R$$

hence

$$x \models_M \Diamond \phi \iff y \models_M \phi \text{ for some } y \in X \text{ such that } (x, y) \in R.$$

The Modal Logic K

Classes of frames induce modal logics; for now: all frames.

Axiomatization:

▶ *Propositional Reasoning:*

- ▶ Modus ponens $\phi; \phi \rightarrow \psi / \psi$
- ▶ all instances of propositional tautologies

▶ *Necessitation*

$$\frac{\phi}{\Box\phi}$$

- ▶ All instances of axiom

$$(K) \quad \Box(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow \Box\phi \rightarrow \Box\psi.$$

Soundness and Completeness

$\Phi \vdash \psi$ if $\phi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \phi_n \rightarrow \psi$ is derivable for some $\phi_1, \dots, \phi_n \in \Phi$.

Soundness If $\Phi \vdash \psi$ then $\Phi \models \psi$ (Proof: Induction over \vdash)

(Strong) Completeness If $\Phi \models \psi$ then $\Phi \vdash \psi$

Reword: Φ *consistent* if $\Phi \not\vdash \perp$

- ▶ Soundness: Φ satisfiable $\rightarrow \Phi$ consistent
- ▶ (Strong) Completeness: Φ consistent $\rightarrow \Phi$ satisfiable
 - ▶ Proof: Satisfy consistent Φ in *canonical model*, with worlds = maximally consistent sets.

Graded Modal Logic

(Fine 1972) *Count* successors:

$$x \models_M \Box_k \phi \iff |\{y \in X \mid (x, y) \in R \text{ and } y \models_M \neg \phi\}| \leq k$$

$$x \models_M \Diamond_k \phi \iff |\{y \in X \mid (x, y) \in R \text{ and } y \models_M \phi\}| > k.$$

(Note $\Box = \Box_0$, $\Diamond_0 = \Diamond$).

Alternative semantics: *Multigraphs* (D'Agostino/Visser 2002)

$$(X, \mu : X \times X \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \cup \{\infty\}, \pi)$$

$$x \models \Box_k \phi \iff \mu(x, \llbracket \neg \phi \rrbracket) \leq k$$

$$x \models \Diamond_k \phi \iff \mu(x, \llbracket \phi \rrbracket) > k.$$

Equivalent, i.e. makes the same (sets of) formulas satisfiable.

Axiomatizing Graded Modal Logic

(Fine 1972)

Propositional reasoning plus

$$\begin{aligned} & \phi / \Box_0 \phi \\ & \Box_0(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow \Box_0 \phi \rightarrow \Box_0 \psi \\ & \Diamond_k \phi \rightarrow \Diamond_l \phi \quad (l < k) \\ & \Diamond_k \phi \leftrightarrow \bigvee_{i=-1}^k (\Diamond_i(\phi \wedge \psi) \wedge \Diamond_{k-1-i}(\phi \wedge \neg \psi)) \\ & \Box_0(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow \Diamond_k \phi \rightarrow \Diamond_k \psi \end{aligned}$$

(with $\Diamond_{-1} \phi \equiv \top$)

Description Logics

... feature ingredients from graded modal logic:

$$\exists R \equiv \diamond^R$$

$$\forall R \equiv \square^R$$

$$\geq n R \equiv \diamond_{n-1}^R$$

$$\leq n R \equiv \neg \diamond_n^R$$

E.g.

Elephant = (= 2 hasPart.tusk) \sqcap (= 1 hasPart.trunk) \sqcap (= 4 hasPart.leg)

Probabilistic Modal Logic

Exchange $\mu : X \times X \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \cup \{\infty\}$ for *Markov Chain* (X, μ, π)

- ▶ $\mu(x, \cdot)$ *probability measure on X* for each $x \in X$

Operators L_p ‘with probability $\geq p$ ’ ($p \in \mathbb{Q} \cap [0, 1]$)

$$x \models L_p \phi \iff \mu(x, \llbracket \phi \rrbracket) \geq p$$

Define ‘with probability $\leq p$ ’:

$$M_p = L_{1-p} \neg$$

E.g.

- ▶ Probabilistic concurrent systems: finished $\vee M_{0.1}$ error
- ▶ Uncertain belief: $L_{1/2}^{\text{Draghi}} L_{1/3}^{\text{Yellen}}$ Recession

(No) Compactness

- ▶ Logic \mathcal{L} *compact* if every finitely satisfiable set of \mathcal{L} -formulas is satisfiable.
- ▶ Strong completeness implies compactness.

Probabilistic modal logic fails to be compact:

$$\{L_{p-1/n}a \mid n \in \mathbb{N}\} \cup \{\neg L_p a\}$$

is finitely satisfiable but not satisfiable.

Axiomatizing Probabilistic Modal Logic: The Problem

Have

$$L_p(\phi \wedge \psi) \wedge L_q(\phi \wedge \neg\psi) \rightarrow L_{p+q}\phi$$

but no reasonable converse

Axiomatizing Probabilistic Modal Logic: The Easy Part

$$\begin{aligned} &L_o\phi \\ &L_p\top \\ &L_p\phi \rightarrow \neg L_q\neg\phi(p+q > 1) \\ &\neg L_p\phi \rightarrow M_p\phi \\ &\phi \rightarrow \psi / L_p\phi \rightarrow L_p\psi \end{aligned}$$

Axiomatizing Probabilistic Modal Logic: The Hard Part

(Heifetz/Mongin 2001)

For $\phi = (\phi_1, \dots, \phi_m)$, $\psi = (\psi_1, \dots, \psi_n)$ put

$$\begin{aligned}\phi^{(k)} &\equiv \bigvee_{1 \leq l_1 < \dots < l_k \leq m} (\phi_{l_1} \vee \dots \vee \phi_{l_k}) \\ \phi \leftrightarrow \psi &\equiv \bigwedge_{k=1}^{\max(m,n)} \phi^{(k)} \leftrightarrow \psi^{(k)}.\end{aligned}$$

Rule (B):

$$\frac{(\phi_1, \dots, \phi_m) \leftrightarrow (\psi_1, \dots, \psi_n)}{\bigwedge_{i=1}^m L_{p_i} \phi_i \wedge \bigwedge_{j=2}^n M_{q_j} \psi_j \rightarrow L_{p_1 + \dots + p_m - q_2 - \dots - q_n} \psi_1}$$

Linear Inequalities

(Halpern/Fagin/Megiddo 1990) *n-ary modal operators*

$$\sum_{i=1}^n a_i I(\phi_i) \geq b \quad (a_i, b \in \mathbb{Q})$$

interpreted by

$$\llbracket I(\phi) \rrbracket_x = \mu(x, \llbracket \phi \rrbracket)$$

E.g.

$$I(\text{MunichChampion}) \geq 10 \cdot I(\text{NurembergChampion})$$

Same for graded logic \rightarrow *Presburger modal logic* (Demri/Lugiez 2006):

$$3 \cdot \#_{\text{hasGame}} \text{won} + 1 \cdot \#_{\text{hasGame}} \text{tied} \geq 37 \rightarrow \neg \text{relegated.}$$

E.g. *majority logic* (Pacuit/Salame 2004)

$$W\phi = \#(\phi) \geq \#(\neg\phi)$$

Neighbourhood Semantics

Compositional semantics of \Box over X requires

$$\llbracket \Box \rrbracket : 2^X \rightarrow 2^X$$

or, transposing,

$$\mathfrak{N} : X \rightarrow 2^{(2^X)}$$

– that's a *neighbourhood frame*:

A neighbourhood of $x \iff A \in \mathfrak{N}(x)$.

Then

$$x \models \Box \phi \iff \llbracket \phi \rrbracket \in \mathfrak{N}(x)$$

Axiomatizing Neighbourhood Logic

Propositional reasoning plus *replacement of equivalents*:

$$\frac{\phi \leftrightarrow \psi}{\Box \phi \leftrightarrow \Box \psi}$$

Monotone Neighbourhoods

Impose *monotonicity*

$$\frac{\phi \rightarrow \psi}{\Box \phi \rightarrow \Box \psi}$$

→ *monotone neighbourhood frames*:

$$A \in \mathfrak{N}(x) \wedge A \subseteq B \rightarrow B \in \mathfrak{N}(x)$$

Game Logic

Monotonicity plus *seriality*:

$$\Box T \quad \Diamond T$$

Semantically:

$$X \in \mathfrak{N}(x), \emptyset \notin \mathfrak{N}(x).$$

Temporalized multi-agent version: *game logic* (Parikh 1983)

$[a]\phi$ 'Angel can enforce ϕ in game a '

$\langle a \rangle \phi$ 'Demon can enforce ϕ in game a '

Conditional Logics

Binary operator $\cdot \Rightarrow \cdot$ for non-material implication,
e.g. 'if – then normally' (*default implication*):

$$\models (\text{Monday} \Rightarrow \text{work}) \not\vdash ((\text{Monday} \wedge \text{sick}) \Rightarrow \text{work})$$

(*non-monotonic conditional*)

Selection Function Semantics

Conditional frame $(X, (R_A), \pi)$:

$$R_A \subseteq X \times X \quad (A \subseteq X)$$

$xR_A y$ 'at x , y is most typical for condition A '.

$\phi \Rightarrow \cdot$ is box over $R_{[\phi]}$:

$$x \models \phi \Rightarrow \psi \quad \text{iff} \quad \forall y. (xR_\phi y \rightarrow y \models \psi).$$

The Conditional Logic *CK*

= The logic of all conditional frames

- ▶ replacement of equivalents on the left:

$$\frac{\phi \leftrightarrow \phi'}{(\phi \Rightarrow \psi) \leftrightarrow (\phi' \Rightarrow \psi)}$$

- ▶ *normality* on the right:

$$(\phi \Rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \chi)) \rightarrow (\phi \Rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\phi \Rightarrow \chi).$$

Reasoning Principles = Frame Conditions

$$ID \quad \phi \Rightarrow \phi \quad xR_\phi y \rightarrow y \models \phi$$

$$CEM \quad (\phi \Rightarrow \psi) \vee (\phi \Rightarrow \neg\psi) \quad xR_\phi y \wedge xR_\phi y' \rightarrow y = y'$$

$$MP \quad (\phi \Rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow \phi \rightarrow \psi \quad xR_\phi x$$

(Burgess 1981; Kraus/Lehmann/Magidor 1990)

ID plus

$$DIS \quad (\phi \Rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow (\psi \Rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow ((\phi \vee \psi) \Rightarrow \chi)$$

$$CM \quad (\phi \Rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow (\phi \Rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow ((\phi \wedge \chi) \Rightarrow \psi)$$

Cautious Monotony:

$$(\text{Monday} \Rightarrow \text{work}) \rightarrow (\text{Monday} \Rightarrow \text{sick}) \rightarrow ((\text{Monday} \wedge \text{sick}) \Rightarrow \text{work})$$

Preferential Models

KLM complete for *preferential models* (X, R, π) :

- ▶ $R \subseteq X^3$
- ▶ $Rxyz$: 'y more typical than z as an alternative to x'

$$Rxyz \rightarrow Rxyy$$

$$(Rxyz \wedge Rxzw) \rightarrow Rxyw$$

with

$$x \models \phi \Rightarrow \psi \quad \text{iff} \quad \forall y. (Rxyy \rightarrow \exists z. (Rxzy \wedge \forall t. (Rxtz \rightarrow M, t \models \psi))).$$

Coalition Logic / Alternating-Time Temporal Logic

- ▶ $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$ set of *agents*
- ▶ *Concurrent game structure*: at each state x ,
 - ▶ sets S_i^x of *moves* ($i \in N$)
 - ▶ *outcome function*

$$f_x : \left(\prod_{i \in N} S_i^x \right) \rightarrow X$$

- ▶ Operators $[C]$ ‘coalition C can force’

$$x \models [C]\phi \iff \exists \sigma_C \in \prod_{i \in C} S_i^x . \forall \sigma_{N-C} \in \prod_{i \in N-C} S_i^x . f_x \langle \sigma_C, \sigma_{N-C} \rangle \models \phi .$$

Axiomatizing Coalition Logic

$$\neg[C]\perp$$

$$[C]\top$$

$$\neg[\emptyset]\neg\phi \rightarrow [N]\phi$$

$$[C](\phi \wedge \psi) \rightarrow [C]\phi$$

$$[C]\phi \wedge [D]\psi \rightarrow [C \cup D](\phi \wedge \psi) \quad \text{if } C \cap D \neq \emptyset.$$

Summing up

- ▶ Modalities are just logical operators
- ▶ Broad range of syntactic and semantic phenomena
- ▶ Common features:
 - ▶ Models consist of *worlds* / *states*
 - ▶ Worlds are connected by *transitions*, broadly construed:
 - ▶ relational
 - ▶ weighted
 - ▶ probabilistic
 - ▶ game-based
 - ▶ proposition-indexed
 - ▶ proximity-based

Tomorrow:

- ▶ Everything is coalgebraic :)